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THE SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE: 
FROM SCHOLARLY INSIDERS TO THE PULL OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATE LAW FIRMS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Where does international justice draw its authority in an international scene largely driven by 
self-regulated professional markets for the settlement of transnational disputes? To revisit this 
classical debate, this article connects the professional and social structure of dispute settlement 
mechanisms to their social credibility among users of international justice. Drawing on extensive 
biographical databases, it suggests that the growth of investor-state disputes is favoring a shift 
from a professional market shaped by scholarly insiders to one dominated by corporate legal 
elites. It links this dynamic of the field to the contrasted development of a scholarly meritocracy 
of international litigators, and the model of the Wall Street law firm which is sustaining the 
continuous expansion of private arbitration. These changes are further reflected in dynamics of 
alignments, within the wider marketplace of users of international justice, to structural changes 
in the global economy that favor the expansion of flexible strategies of dispute settlement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With the increased traction of international justice in global affairs in the last years, there 
has been a growing interest for international lawyers and the role they play to sustain the 
authority of international dispute settlement mechanisms. 1 Legal debates classically emphasized 
the legitimating role played by this ‘invisible college’ of international lawyers, who operate for 
the most part within self-regulated professional markets. When coined in the 1970s, the term 
referred to a then small cluster of predominantly law professors.2 Since then, there has been a 
dramatic acceleration of the pace of institutionalization of the international scene, and with it a 
growth of the marketplace for international justice.3 Arguably, the most spectacular 
transformation has been the expansion of international investment arbitration from the 1990s. 
With these changes, the role of international lawyers has been increasingly under fire. The ‘club’ 
of international arbitrators4 is seen to be turning international arbitration into an echo chamber of 
corporate interests;5 for its part, the ‘Western monopoly’ over the ‘international bar’ of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is considered to be hampering the authority of the ICJ as a 
world court.6  
A major difficulty with these accounts is that they tend to reproduce - albeit in the form 
of a criticism - discourses that are produced by professionals of international justice themselves.7 
Typically they channel the attention towards the rhetoric that sustains the distribution of 
professional positions in international law along distinct functional, institutional and normative 
divisions of labor, predominantly between the so-called ‘public’ side of international justice 
(inter-state adjudication) and the ‘private’ side of international justice, dealing with transnational 
business disputes. Thus, where private international lawyers emphasize the ethical self-
regulation of international arbitrators,8 debates in public international law pinpoint the 
detrimental effects of the fragmentation of international law. 
To go beyond these oppositions, this article argues that it is necessary to move away from 
the professional and institutional categories that these discourses draw on. It emphasizes rather 
the correlation between the professional markets for international justice, and the social 
credibility of international dispute settlement mechanisms. Its cue is that mapping the social 
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spaces in which professionals of international justice are situated can help account for the 
authority, over time, of international justice institutions.  Focusing on the structural 
characteristics of the marketplaces for international justice can provide a key, furthermore, to 
explain current dynamics of change that remain otherwise obscured in existing accounts. 
Reflecting the prominence taken by disputes between states and corporations over ‘mega 
politics,’9 recent debates have noted the growing convergence between the two sides of 
international justice. Emblematically, core institutions of investment arbitration like the World 
Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) are moving towards 
‘treaty-based’ arbitration, and there is an increased circulation of rules across forums of 
international justice. In the face of mounting criticisms against investment arbitration, this is 
notably seen as favoring a ‘return of the state’ in high stakes disputes between states and 
corporations.10 Focused, however, predominantly on procedural rules and existing institutional 
divides between public and private international justice, these accounts do not help explain the 
empirical drivers that lead either to the ‘fragmentation’ of international law, or its 
‘harmonization;’11 nor do they help assessing their wider impact on the authority of international 
justice.   
By contrast, this article recalls the characteristic of international justice as a market for 
‘symbolic goods’12 – a characterization rendered all the more relevant given the absence, on the 
international scene, of a normative hierarchy and top-down regulation of professions of 
international justice. The authority, therefore, of international justice institutions is derived as 
much from the belief in international dispute-settlement mechanisms among audiences of users, 
foremost states and corporations, as it is driven by professional competition. Building on a 
structural sociology approach, this paper correlates the characteristics of professionals of 
international justice – their juridical, but also political, economic and social resources – to their 
capacity to respond to, and refract, the interests of these external constituencies.  In doing so, it 
documents a dramatic shift, within the ‘invisible college’ of international law: the move from a 
professional marketplace of international justice privileging scholarly insiders to one dominated 
by multinational corporate law firms. More than anecdotal, this shift has a direct import for the 
authority of international justice. Indeed it is favoring the prominence of a model of production 
and reproduction of legal practice and professional hierarchies - that of the ‘Wall street law 
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firm’- which is particularly well positioned to wage multi-front legal wars according to the 
interests of clients, and could thus be contributing to the continuous fragmentation of 
international law. But this model is also a powerful engine for the co-optation of emerging 
global-trade oriented legal elites from the Global South13 into flexible, segmented, marketplaces 
for international justice. Beyond a disruption of the divide between public and private 
international justice therefore, it is the whole structure of international justice itself that may be 
gradually shifting.  
To flesh out this thesis, this article proceeds in three steps. The first section briefly 
describes the research strategy. This involved a necessarily broad purview. To trace the 
transformation, over time, of the social and professional structure of international justice, this 
article takes on the challenge of considering together both sides of international justice – public 
and private – to underscore their parallel and competing development. The second section 
connects this social history of international justice to the professional monopolies that gradually 
emerged around the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for inter-state adjudication on the one 
hand, and the market for commercial arbitration on the other hand. The description of the 
differentiated development of these two sides of international justice leads to a tentative 
conclusion. Building on empirical data that had yet to be compiled, detailing the profiles of 
judges and counsels before the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ), this empirical analysis indeed suggests that contrary to prevailing accounts14 the 
professional and social structure of the market for inter-state adjudication corroborates the 
symbolic authority of the ICJ as a world court. However, the dynamic of development of this 
marketplace, that is, its internal differentiation, has also fostered its insulation from political and 
economic interests, and this is rendering it increasingly vulnerable to outside pressure - be it 
political backlash or the professional competition of multinational corporate law firms. By 
contrast, the capacity of adaptation (and alignment) of the latter with corporate and political 
interests helps explain the dynamic of growth and continuous expansion of international 
commercial arbitration, including towards investor-state disputes from the 1990s. It is this 
contrasted dynamic that accounts for what the final section sees as an ongoing transformation of 
the structure of the field of international justice. It suggests that the dynamic of this shift is 
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reinforcing the prominence of the model of the ‘Wall street law firm,’ which radically differs 
from the erstwhile ‘invisible college.’  
 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A MARKET FOR SYMBOLIC GOODS 
 
Taking on the characteristic of international justice as a market for symbolic goods shifts 
the focus towards the dynamic relationship between the restricted professional markets of 
producers of international law and the enlarged markets of users of international justice. 
Focusing on this dynamic relationship between producers and users of international justice is a 
way to connect the development of international justice mechanisms to wider contextual political 
and economic variables.15 Highlighting the fragility of the symbolic authority of international 
justice institutions, this also underscores that their sustainability depends on the capacity to 
invest continuously in the reproduction of the belief in their authority. In this relation with users 
of international justice, the channels of (re)production of legal knowledge and legal hierarchies 
play a central role. In this process, the insiders of the ‘international bar’ of the ICJ or the ‘club’ 
of private arbitration hold a commanding position. They control all the more the rules and 
practices of these mechanisms of international justice that they have contributed to their shaping. 
Yet, these insiders must also respond to the specific interests of the wider professional markets 
who act as their correspondents, referents or potential users at the national level.  
To trace this dynamic relation, this article builds on the hypothesis of a ‘field’ of 
international justice. This analytical tool refers to a relatively autonomous social microcosm, 
made up of professional networks and hierarchical relationships, and types of resources that 
determine the rules of the game and status within the space, all of which can change over time.16 
This hypothesis echoes earlier studies that have underscored the common genesis of public and 
private international justice institutions at the turn of the twentieth century.17 Going back to these 
initial encounters is a way to trace connections over time within the field,18 including the drivers 
of professional competition and their effects on the structure of the field.  
Empirically, the research strategy focused on professionals involved in inter-state 
adjudication (the PCIJ and the ICJ) on the one hand, and in international private arbitration, 
whether institutional (such as the ICSID and the Chamber of arbitration of the International 
	  	   7 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris - ICC) or ad hoc. It aimed at gaining some knowledge about the 
social and professional characteristics of the agents involved in these two sides of international 
justice. Two sets of qualitative data were gathered. The first purported to map out the 
hierarchical structures that determine access and status within these marketplaces by looking at 
the resources of the agents invested in them - legal, political, social, economic, but also familial - 
and by tracing the national and international components of their professional trajectories. This 
was done by building a unique biographical database of 135 individual profiles of international 
judges and counsels associated with the PCIJ and the ICJ on the one hand, 19 and by relying on 
the findings of earlier studies on the growth of international arbitration from the 1980s on the 
other hand.20  
The second aim was to connect these evolutions to the enlarged markets of users of 
international justice. To do this, this article relied on the specific position of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) as both a forum for the settlement of international disputes, and the 
historical - albeit symbolical - function of endorsement of judges appointed to the ICJ (and 
before that, the PCIJ) given to the national groups of arbitrators to the PCA. It construed, for this 
purpose, the lists of arbitrators to the PCA as a showcase of (potential) users of international 
justice users. These lists were compared at two different periods: in 1999 on the anniversary of 
the first century of existence of the institution, and in 2013.21 Based on this database of 533 
profiles, the aim was to uncover patterns in the backgrounds of these individuals by looking at 
their positions at the national and international levels, and to gain some knowledge on their 
channels of internationalization. These lists certainly have a purely symbolic value. But they 
remain an indicator of international notoriety for national legal elites who (strive to) position 
themselves as intermediaries or referents towards transnational dispute settlement mechanisms 
and the inner core of the ‘club’ of international arbitrators or the ‘international bar’ of the ICJ 
who hold the quasi monopoly over them. Their profiles are also an indicator of the orientations 
of the states, which select them. State membership to the founding treaties of the PCA has 
continuously expanded since 1899 to 117 members as of November 2015, with a relative surge 
of adhesion from the early 2000s, particularly from Asian and East-European countries. While 
this is reflecting a wider state interest for international justice, the specific backgrounds and 
expertise of their national groups of arbitrators also give an indication on the modalities of 
	  	   8 
production of legal knowledge and practice that are being privileged by states for the 
international settlement of disputes.22  
 
THE CONTRASTED CONSOLIDATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AROUND PROFESSIONAL MONOPOLIES  
 
What were the drivers that triggered the dramatic reawakening – albeit widely 
contrasted23 – of both sides of international justice from the 1980s? Turning back to the genesis 
of international justice is key to understand what social and professional resources were brought 
into these nascent institutions - but also to uncover the conflicts and contradictions that existed at 
the outset and that help explain their differentiated dynamic of expansion.  
 
Inter-state adjudication: the gradual constitution of a two-tier marketplace between 
multi-positioned legal elites and a scholarly meritocracy of insiders  
 
Studies on the genesis of international justice institutions at the turn of the twentieth 
century have underscored that the social and professional properties of the agents associated with 
these nascent institutions played a key role to enable them to gain credibility in a context of weak 
institutionalization of the international legal scene. Their multi-positioning - across scholarly 
positions, legal practice, service to state diplomacy and at times political positions at the national 
level - was a key condition precisely because these lawyers could at once reflect national 
political and economic interests and deflect them by constructing the doctrine of international 
law as universal. 24 At the stage of the genesis, legal knowledge and scholarly affiliations were 
therefore both a driver of complementarity - connecting legal elites from different parts of the 
world within scholarly networks and societies - and a condition for the symbolic authority of 
international justice institutions. The biographical data gathered for the purpose of this article on 
judges and counsels at the PCIJ and ICJ underscores the remarkable continuity of these 
characteristics in the social structure of the marketplace for inter-state adjudication. Beyond this 
continuity, however, there has been a gradual, internal, differentiation within this small 
marketplace. The social, professional, geographical backgrounds of judges remain 
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complementary; on the other hand, the ‘international bar’ of counsels is now dominated by a 
cluster of European legal scholars. Contrary to recent studies on the ICJ which have pinpointed 
this as a ‘Western monopoly’ over the ‘international bar’ of the court,25 this internal 
differentiation helps explain, albeit paradoxically, both the symbolic authority gained by the ICJ 
from the 1980s as the ‘world’ court, but also its protracted vulnerability to external shocks. 
The profiles of judges have thus remained relatively constant over time. At the stage of 
the genesis, these were characterized by a stark contrast between judges from core European 
states and the US – who were mostly law professors and jurisconsultes acting on behalf of their 
state diplomacies – and non-European judges, who, for their part, were ‘gentlemen politicians of 
law’26 holding the dual heading of political elites in their respective countries and law professors. 
This contrasted profile is reflected in the 36 successive judges nominated to the PCIJ (between 
1921 and 1939). For their part, the eight counsels identified as repeat players before the PCIJ (as 
counsels in more than 4 cases)27 were typically, already, from core European countries. They 
were usually law professors acting as counsels for their own countries, like Jules Basdevant for 
France, Erich Kaufman for Germany or Sir Henry Beckett for the UK.  
The analysis of the profiles of 43 judges of the ICJ underscores the remarkable resilience 
of these characteristics. Judges continue to combine individually or collectively the three 
characteristics of the stage of the genesis - scholarly capital, legal practice and service to state 
diplomacies. A similar contrast can be identified in the profiles of judges from Europe and the 
US compared to judges from outside Europe/the US. However, contrary to the early stage of the 
genesis, typically judges from Europe and the US are no longer defined by a scholarly form of 
capital.28 They primarily, if not essentially, start their careers within the legal services of foreign 
affairs ministries, with some variations in this common channel of access to international legal 
positions. For their part, judges from outside Europe/the US, particularly judges from former 
colonies, still display a trajectory of internationalization determined by a portfolio of extremely 
strong political, economic, and social national resources. In their case, access to international 
positions builds on this national platform but they also have all validated their legal expertise 
with international credentials, both scholarly - with degrees predominantly from core European 
universities such as fellowships at the Hague Academy of International Law 29 - and 
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institutionally, through positions within international institutions like the UN International Law 
Commission.  
This dual profile provides for a form of complementarity - and thereby universal 
credential - within this side of international justice, which is therefore predominantly achieved 
through the specific channel of legal education and scholarly societies - with a definite and 
continuous pull towards a cluster of core universities in Europe and the US. Indeed, the co-
optation of gentlemen politicians of law to universal legal principles through scholarly networks 
and affiliations at core European scholarly centers is precisely what nurtured the promotion of 
the ICJ, and before that, the PCIJ, as the world court. The Institute of International Law (Institut 
de droit international - IDI) emerged early on as the first transnational network of legal scholars 
in the 1870s, and the sociétés savantes created in its wake provided for a ‘bank of symbolic 
capital’30 vouching for the reputation and credibility of international lawyers as neutral umpires, 
while also ensuring the allegiance of legal elites from the Global South to the cause of 
international law. With the independence eras of the 1960s, the IDI pursued its strategies of co-
optation of legal elites from former colonies. The Geneva Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, founded in 1926 with the purpose of training future international lawyers and 
diplomats31 also played a central role in this regard, as did the Hague Academy of International 
Law. 
The biographical data gathered points, however, to a gradual, internal, and stark 
differentiation within this small marketplace:  between judges and counsels. By contrast, indeed, 
what developed into the ‘international bar’ of the ICJ is now exclusively made up of learned 
practitioners from Europe, that is: essentially legal scholars. The characteristics of the counsels 
that appeared repeatedly before the ICJ at inception were similar to the stage of the genesis, in 
that they were mostly law professors also serving as jurisconsultes. From the mid-1980s, 
however, the profile of members of the international bar is drastically transformed, with a 
gradual monopolization of cases among a very restricted core of predominantly European 
professors, who all rely quasi-exclusively on their scholarly credentials.32  
The defining characteristic of these repeat-players is also that their scholarly credentials 
are essentially meritocratic. This suggests that, compared to their earlier counterparts, access to 
this small marketplace is no longer defined by resources drawn from outside the field, be they 
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political, economic or social. For example, the profile of Ian Brownlie, described as the ‘dean of 
(the) practitioners’ before the ICJ from the mid-1980s, contrasts markedly with that of Sir 
Beckett, of the earlier generation, who was both a barrister and a jurisconsulte at the UK Foreign 
Office. With an aura gained as main counsel for Nicaragua in 1984, Brownlie monopolized more 
than half of the ICJ docket from this case until his death in 2010.33 His trajectory epitomizes the 
characteristics of this small meritocratic elite. With modest origins, he won a scholarship to read 
law at Hertford College, Oxford and completed his Oxford DPhil in 1961 under the supervision 
of Sir Claud Humpfrey Meredith Waldock, a repeat-player of the early development of the ICJ, 
at the Chichele Chair of Public international law. Brownlie also typified a UK model, that of 
learned barrister34 which contrasts with a continental model of professor-practitioner, in France 
or Germany.35  
This gradual internal differentiation of the marketplace for inter-state adjudication 
reflects in great part external variables. After their relative success during the ‘Geneva episode’ 
of the inter-war period, the international justice mechanisms created during the first two decades 
of the twentieth century remained very much a sideshow in global politics. The ICJ survived in 
the shadow of Cold war and decolonization politics with a meek, at times empty, docket, 
especially following the shunning of the court by newly independent states after a number of 
controversial decisions.36 These external drivers help explain the retreat into an Ivory tower of 
the international bar of the ICJ. 37 Their correlate distancing from political and economic 
interests certainly contributed to the gradual autonomization of this small marketplace from 
national diplomacies. But this also suggests that it fostered their insulation from wider 
transformations on the international scene and the global economy.  
These two models of learned practitioners indeed point to the dynamics of reproduction 
of access and status within this small meritocratic elite. This dynamic helps account, somewhat 
contradictorily, for both the formidable – though symbolic – revival of the ICJ from the 1980s, 
and the limited capacity of this restricted marketplace to deflect external shocks. These dynamics 
of reproduction, indeed, are defined around mentor-pupil relations at a cluster of European 
academic centers, like the Chichele Chair of Public international law at Oxford, which along 
with the Whewell Chair at Cambridge are incubators of international litigators from the UK, or 
the Université de droit of Paris-Ouest Nanterre around Alain Pellet in France.38 As noted by a 
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young recruit into this small milieu, ‘any caste must organize the conditions of its own 
survival.’39 The corollary of the limited demand for public international justice and the 
peripheral position of this nutshell of learned practitioners has been the constitution of this 
professional space into a restricted, meritocratic space, with scholarly and relational barriers of 
entry. These mentor-pupil relations determine rules of access which can be traced in the 
hierarchical composition of the counseling teams in inter-state disputes. For example, Ian 
Brownlie mentored Alain Pellet in the Nicaragua case, propelling the latter as a tenor of the 
international bar. But this space is now also defined predominantly in charismatic terms 
sometimes doubled with family relations.40 These high barriers of entry not only define a 
collective form of legitimacy based on reputation; they also fit with the definition by these 
professionals of the proper rules of the games of inter-state litigation. As indicated by a 
prominent member: ‘to enter this universe, it is preferable but not essential to be good; what 
matters is to belong to the small circle of renown (counsels) … you have to know the rules of the 
game … it is absolutely essential to have a mentor.’41  
The ICJ gained renewed prominence as the world court following the Nicaragua decision 
of 1984-1986 and the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986, which, 
according to the doctrine, brokered the ‘reconciliation of the ICJ with the Third World.’42 A 
closer look at the composition of the bench at the time, and the relations between judges and 
counsels, underscores the role played by the dynamic of this small marketplace to foster this 
outcome. The success of these decisions in promoting the ICJ as the world court, indeed, also 
hinged on another defining feature of this space: the relations of the European professors of this 
meritocratic elite, as professors and mentors, with gentlemen politicians of law, notably from 
former European colonies. Here again, external variables greatly shaped these relations. In 
particular, the Hague Academy of international law had attracted the support of the Ford 
Foundation and other US Foundations from the 1960s, with the intent of ‘mak(ing) contact with 
and influenc(ing) the elites of the newly-decolonizing Third world.’43 This support waned from 
the 1970s due to the perceived failure of this institution as a ‘beach head’ for US interests, and 
the Academy returned to being an ‘old world consortium.’44 This not only reinforced the 
prominent position of the core European members of the international bar of the ICJ as gate-
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keepers for access into their restricted marketplace. It also confirmed the key role their relations 
with pupils from the Global South could play to sustain the symbolic authority of the ICJ. 
 The Nicaragua and Frontier decisions can be seen as a microcosm of these relations of 
co-optation. The specific conjuncture at the turn of the 1980s was the nomination to the bench of 
the Court of new judges from former colonies. In particular, the Chamber deciding over the 
Frontier decision was chaired by Mohammed Bedjaoui, elected to the ICJ in 1981. An Algerian 
diplomat and lawyer, with law degrees from French universities, his professional trajectory was 
typical of a gentleman politician of law: Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Algiers, 
Ambassador to France, President of Algeria’s Constitutional Council, minister of Foreign Affairs 
in 2005-2007. At once a prominent advocate of the ‘Third World’ in a New International 
Economic Order in the 1970s, his international legal stature had also been validated through 
membership to the IDI and lectures at the Hague Academy.45 The profile of Georges Abi Saab, 
ad hoc judge in this case also illustrates the links with the scholarly elite of the international bar 
of the ICJ. Born into a French-speaking family of Cairo, a professor at the Geneva Graduate 
Institute of International Studies from 1963, he became an occasional member of the 
international bar of the ICJ from the Tunisia v. Libya case in 1978 thanks to his relations ‘with 
many of the well- known players in international justice’46 as a former pupil of Sir Robert 
Jennings. The latter had been elected president of the IDI in 1983 and was the successor of Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht at the Whewell Chair of international law at Cambridge from 1955.  
These two decisions have contributed to the formidable symbolic capital of the Court, 
and to the growth of the docket of the ICJ with an expansion of both the substance areas of the 
disputes at stake47 and their geographical spread toward Africa or the Middle East. Yet, recent 
controversial decisions48 underline the protracted fragility of the public side of international 
justice. This could suggest that the consolidation of the monopoly of the international bar around 
extremely strict scholarly (mentor-pupil) and charismatic modalities of reproduction limits the 
capacity of this restricted marketplace to generate innovation from inside and renders it, rather, 
permeable to external constraints – including the increased professional competition since the 
2000s from contenders like multinational corporate law firms. Further developed in the last 
section, this argument is first tested by recounting the contrasted dynamic that has fostered the 
continuous growth of the private side of international justice from the 1980s.    
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Corporate lawyers, ‘grand old men,’ and the Wall Street law firm as an engine for the 
sustained boom of commercial arbitration 
 
The dynamics that favored the growth of the market for international commercial 
arbitration from the 1980s have already been substantially traced in earlier studies.49 Recounting 
this process, however, is necessary as these dynamics help explain the growth since the 1990s of 
investment arbitration, and with it wider transformations in the relations between the two sides of 
international justice. The early development of the private side of international justice - what 
became institutionalized as international commercial arbitration - followed a similar path than 
the public side of international justice. The PCA dwindled to an empty shell after the creation of 
the PCIJ, with both institutions competing for the same pool of disputes between sovereign 
states.50 For its part, international commercial arbitration was sidelined in the oil disputes 
triggered by decolonization between newly independent states and Western corporations.51 
The later surge of commercial arbitration stemmed in great part from external shocks and 
wider transformations in the global economy. The oil crises of the 1970s and the move toward 
North-South economic relations fostered the demand by multinational corporations for flexible 
forms of conflict resolution, away from national courts in the Global South. This growth was 
also spurred by the entry into play within the market for commercial arbitration of a new 
generation of contenders: multinational corporate law firms from the US, which combined 
considerable resources, including their proximity with businesses and elites in the South. The 
alliance between US corporate lawyers with European professors, the ‘grand old men’ and 
architects of the principles of the lex mercatoria, contributed to legitimating this form of justice 
by granting ‘a legally principled manner to treat multinational agreements with sovereign states 
in the Middle East and Africa as if they were private contracts.’52  
The alliance and complementarity of positions between these professors and practitioners 
(QCs, high judges, senior partners of multinational law firms) converged toward a small 
cosmopolitan network of professors and practitioners who collectively embody the symbolic 
authority of this form of justice: what some commentators refer to as the ‘super arbitrators,’ who 
are ‘not just the mafia, but a smaller, inner mafia.’53 This complementarity also allowed US 
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practitioners to gain some scholarly credibility, and learned practitioners from Europe to get 
closer to business interests. In turn, high barriers of entry - LLMs from North American law 
schools and positions within multinational corporate law firms - enabled the co-optation of 
national legal elites into this marketplace, while also legitimating this form of ‘offshore’ justice 
away from national judicial proceedings. In this, multinational corporate law firms have played 
an essential role to shape the structures of production and reproduction of access and status 
within this marketplace. The institutional capacity of firms to provide the whole panoply of 
services required by state and corporate clients, by allowing for flexible legal strategies, has 
fostered the continuous expansion of this form of justice. It is also enabling the conversion into 
this space of a variety of resources - not just the symbolic capital of a scholarly form of 
universality as in the case of the international bar of the ICJ - so as to respond to (and pre-empt) 
changing political and economic interests. This helps explain the growth of the market for 
arbitration to new terrains, including investors-states disputes from the 1990s, which the next 
section turns to.  
 
FROM THE GROWTH CRISIS OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TO THE 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE MARKET FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the two institutions that have emerged since the turn of the 2000s 
as the ‘two major players’54 of the thriving market for investment arbitration - the ICSID and the 
PCA - had both remained dormant for decades.55 The explosion of international investment 
agreements56 certainly contributed to the growth of investment treaty arbitration, as did the 
Argentina debt crisis of the end of the 1990s.57 Tracing the strategies pursued within these two 
institutions and the professional composition of the market for investment arbitration underlines 
that this growth built out of two apparently contradictory drivers: the dynamic of the market for 
commercial arbitration, and the symbolic authority gained by the ICJ as the world court from the 
1980s. While this suggests a growing convergence between the two sides of international justice, 
the empirical dynamics of this rapprochement seem to further consolidate a key driver in the 
growth of the market for commercial arbitration: multinational corporate legal firms.  In this 
sense, the debated ‘backlash’ against investment arbitration58 can be construed, rather, like a 
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growth crisis that could indicate a wider restructuring of the marketplace for international justice.  
 
 
 
The boom of investment arbitration: building on the dynamic of the market for 
commercial arbitration and the symbolic authority of the world court   
 
Set up in 1967 as an independent entity of the World Bank Group with the specific aim of 
providing a forum for the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and host states, the 
ICSID aimed at privatizing the relationship between foreign corporations and host states, away 
from the uncomfortable ‘ménage à trois’ involved by the diplomatic protection of foreign 
corporations by home states against host states.59 Its first Secretary General, Aron Broches, then 
general counsel for the World Bank, modeled the rules of ICSID arbitrations to fit what had 
spurred the efficiency of commercial arbitration: the ‘twin influence’ of commercial arbitration 
procedures, and vaguely formulated public international legal principles for the protection of 
foreign investments.60 However, the ICSID was shunned under the Third Worldism debates that 
dominated the UN General Assembly in the 1960s-1970s, and which were epitomized in the 
fierce opposition of Latin American countries against international arbitration.61 The profile of 
the ICSID’s second Secretary General, Ibrahim Shihata, appointed in 1983, director-general of 
the Vienna-based OPEC Fund for International Development in 1973-83 and a proponent of the 
New International Economic Order, contributed to easing this ideological divide by expanding 
membership to the ICSID to Latin American countries. Shihata also played an instrumental role 
in fostering a shift in the profiles of the ICSID panel of arbitrators: ‘it was around this time (the 
mid-1980s) that politicians, professors of economics, chairmen of oil and multinational 
corporations and directors of financial and development institutions started to be replaced by law 
professors, international judges, private legal practitioners, and diplomats in the roster of 
conciliators and arbitrators of the institution.’62 Though symbolic, as less than a third of 
arbitrators in ICSID tribunals are appointed by the ICSID Secretariat,63 this transformation gave 
a signal that fit the institution to the dynamic of the market for commercial arbitration.  
According to doctrinal accounts the revival of the ICSID followed a jurisprudential 
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‘revolution,’ that of the APPL v. Sri Lanka dispute in 1991. 64 This decision recognized the 
capacity for foreign investors to introduce claims on the basis of treaties, notwithstanding the 
specificities of their contracts with host states. It was ‘the serment du Jeu de Paume, better still, 
the storming of the Bastille by investors.’ 65  This transition from contract-based to investment 
treaty-based arbitration opened the potential for ‘a new market for public international lawyers’- 
by making public international law applicable to these disputes. But this shift ‘took place without 
any significant break in the professional profiles of the lawyers dealing with such arbitration.’66 
Indeed, as with the Frontier decision in the case of the ICJ, the APPL dispute constitutes a 
microcosm that reflects how the boom of investment arbitration befitted the dynamic of the 
market for commercial arbitration. The two prominent arbitrators in this decision were Berthold 
Goldman, appointed by APPL, and Ahmed El-Kosheri, appointed as Chair of the tribunal by the 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative council. A French international private law professor,67 
converted to US litigation practice, Goldman was a core architect of the lex mercatoria. El 
Kosheiri for his part was a typical ‘grand old man’ from the Global South. With law degrees 
from Cairo University and France, a professor of international economic law at the International 
University for International development, he also embodied the symbolic authority of the public 
side of international justice, as member of the IDI since1987, and ad hoc judge to the ICJ 
between 1992 and 2003.  
While relying on the alliance between ‘grand old men’ and corporate lawyers - a core 
driver in the growth of commercial arbitration - the expansion of investment arbitration also built 
on the prominence taken by multinational corporate law firms within that market from the late 
1990s. ‘The professionals who later became active in the then emerging field came from the 
same type of law firms that had dealt with the earlier contract-based ICSID arbitrations and other 
international commercial arbitration between private parties. They were commercial arbitration 
specialists.’68 The boom of investment arbitration fostered by this decision fit indeed precisely 
with this dynamic in the market for commercial arbitration. Characteristically, Jan Paulsson, now 
heralded as one of the ‘movers and shakers of investment-treaty arbitration’69 was then a 
spearhead of the generation of contenders that emerged in the market for commercial arbitration 
in the 1980s. As a partner of the Paris outlet of the UK corporate law firm Freshfields, he had 
gained his credentials as an arbitrator entirely from positions within the field of international 
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commercial arbitration. His profile epitomizes the generational shift of this market from an 
informal justice dominated by law professors - the ‘grand old men’ of international law - to a 
form of ‘offshore’ justice dominated by US litigators predominantly operating within 
multinational corporate law firms.70 Paulsson’s advocacy in favor of ‘arbitration without 
privity’71 - which had a long-lasting effect on the field of investment arbitration72 - marketed 
arbitration as a neutral modality for the resolution of disputes related to foreign investments, 
notwithstanding specific contractual terms. This stance was directed at states in the Global 
South73 and heralded corporate lawyers and their law firms as strategically positioned to respond 
to the interests of their clients beyond any North-South ideological divide. The emphasis on 
strategic efficiency also downgraded legal doctrine - and by the same token, law professors - as 
too ambiguous to fit these purposes.  
Yet, the Argentina cases and the legitimacy crisis of investment arbitration they have 
triggered, have been followed with a subtle and ongoing shift in the profile of arbitrators. 
International lawyers associated with the symbolic authority of the ICJ as the world court are 
thus increasingly appointed as arbitrators in disputes between states and investors. For example, 
the appointment, in the Argentina cases, of Georges Abi Saab at once ‘an advocate for the 
periphery’74 and a guardian of the legitimacy of public international justice played a symbolic 
role to signal that the ICSID had ‘become more responsive to sovereign concerns.’75 
Characteristically, the current Secretary General of the PCA, Hugo Siblecz, has described this 
convergence as a ‘cross-pollination’ between the two sides of international justice, which he 
deemed a key condition to enable each to gain in symbolic authority.76  Shifting the focus to the 
empirical drivers of this convergence highlights the acute professional competition it is fostering: 
the ‘clash of ethos’ between ‘two epistemic communities along different lines,’ namely corporate 
lawyers and public international legal scholars.77 The drivers of this professional competition, 
however, seem to be moving ‘the center of gravity increasingly (…) toward the commercial 
arbitration bar.’78 Indeed, the learned practitioners of the ICJ are pulled into treaty investment 
arbitration under the impetus of multinational corporate law firms, which play the role of gate-
keepers for access into the market for investment arbitration.79 As noted somewhat scathingly by 
Charles Brower, one of the ‘elite 15’80 of investment treaty arbitrators as a partner with White & 
Case and now 20 Essex Street Chambers: ‘(w)hile lack of familiarity with public international 
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law may be a barrier to commercial arbitration practitioners entering the field of investment 
treaty arbitration, it is a barrier that can be overcome with relative ease (…) The (…) lack of 
familiarity with litigation techniques and commercial transactions, (…) is less easily remedied. 
(…). It must be “soaked up” through extended exposure:’81 that is, through practice and 
proximity with corporate interests. The differentiation of international justice into two sides - 
public international law and commercial arbitration – seemed therefore to be used as a blueprint 
to feed into a division of labor that reinforces this prominent role played by multinational 
corporate law firms. A core player of the international bar of the ICJ explained how the selection 
of arbitrators from the public side of international justice was effected through a screen-search 
by corporate law firms on behalf of their clients. ‘They have to research five names in 24 hours, 
and there you come out with a label’: as more or less state or business-oriented. By contrast, 
‘multinational corporate law firms have the capacity to play it both ways,’82 that is, to alternate 
between serving the interests of states, or corporations, by waging multi-front legal wars in 
multiple forums - be it arbitration, or inter-state adjudication.  
Indeed, this convergence goes both ways, with a growing involvement of multinational 
corporate law firms in inter-state adjudication. For example, the US multinational corporate law 
firm Foley Hoag has branched out into inter-state adjudication through an intensive political 
marketing with Latin American states, which remain prominent users of this side of international 
justice, by leaning on the symbolic aura of Paul Reichler who was part of the team representing 
Nicaragua in the 1984 decision. For its part, it is a prominent member of the ‘club’ of private 
arbitration, Jan Paulsson, who played an instrumental role in introducing Freshfields to ICJ 
adjudication, through his appointment as counsel for Bahrain in 2001.83 This entry into play of 
corporate lawyers into inter-state adjudication is generating an intense professional competition 
with the established core of the international bar of the ICJ. It is criticized by prominent 
members of this exclusive marketplace for shifting the rules of the game of inter-state 
adjudication from an elegant battle between gentlemen of the law to a procedural exercise 
generating incremental costs.84 However, the growing competition of this new generation of 
contenders who approach international adjudication from the side of the ‘profession’85 seems to 
have pushed some members of the international bar of the ICJ to convert to the model of the 
corporate law firm in their practice as inter-state litigators. Characteristically, Rodnan Bundy has 
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been a repeat-player of inter-state adjudication, as a practitioner within the Paris based law firm 
Cabinet Frère Cholmeley, one of the first ‘cabinets counseils’ to appear repeatedly as counsel 
before the ICJ from the early 1990s. Specialized in inter-state litigation, this small law firm 
merged with the UK multinational corporate law firm Eversheds in 2001. While this is enabling 
the latter to branch out into inter-state adjudication, it is also allowing Bundy to convert to the 
market for commercial arbitration: he has thus set up a branch of the firm strategically positioned 
in Singapore as a new hub for private arbitration in Asia. By contrast, the Cabinet Lysias created 
around Alain Pellet in Paris in the mid-2000s to structure the litigation strategies of his 
expanding team of counsels seems to be operating, still, on the basis of the classical mode of 
reproduction – mentor-pupil relations - of the small scholarly market of counsels to the ICJ. 
Beyond this professional competition, it is indeed the survival of the international bar that 
is at stake, and its capacity to foster a new generation of inter-state litigators. The transformation 
of the profiles of the référendaires of the ICJ – one of the institutional pathways into this side of 
international justice – seems to indicate that the increased competition of multinational corporate 
law firms within this small marketplace is also reflected in the new generation. Référendaires are 
now appointed from a pool of major North-American law schools, including NYU, McGill, 
Columbia or Yale, rather than the traditional European scholarly centers. A key player of the 
international bar of the ICJ tellingly noted that the most efficient access route to inter-state 
adjudication is now: ‘practice within one of the big corporate law firms: Foley Hoag, Eversheds, 
Freshfields, Lalive or White & Case.’86 This could be pointing to a wider structural 
transformation of the marketplace for international justice which is strikingly illustrated by the 
revival of the PCA since the early 2000s. The changing profile of the list of arbitrators to the 
PCA is indicating, further, that this could be correlated with a parallel transformation of the 
markets of users of international justice.  
 
The PCA: a showcase in the ongoing restructuring of the market for international justice  
 
As with the ICSID, the formidable re-emergence of the PCA from the early 2000s was 
closely connected to how key players within the institution, themselves drawn from the field of 
commercial arbitration, endeavored to fit the PCA to the dynamic of this market. The Secretary 
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General of the PCA in the 1990s, Hans Jonkman strategically leaned on a prominent member of 
the field of international commercial arbitration, Howard M. Hotzmann. 87 The latter played a 
key role in the drafting of the PCA’s 1993 ‘Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between 
Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State,’ which adopted the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules for investment disputes arbitrated under the 
auspices of the PCA. This reliance on the dynamic of the market for commercial arbitration is 
further illustrated in the profile of the current Deputy Secretary-General and Principal Legal 
Counsel of the PCA, Brooks W. Daly, as a former counsel at the ICC in Paris, which he joined 
after practicing with the US and UK corporate law firms Latham & Watkins and Hale & Door. 
Beyond, by setting up a strong Secretariat, the institution has endeavored to directly compete 
with other arbitration forums, through a strategy of seduction toward arbitrators: ‘they closely 
tend to arbitrators to compete directly with the ICSID but with a better service and more 
advantages, in terms of remuneration.’88  
A closer examination of the cases arbitrated under the auspices of the PCA - for the most 
part confidential - would be necessary to assess whether this proximity with the dynamic of the 
field of commercial and investment arbitration is reflected in the profiles of the arbitrators and 
counsels, and their selection.  But this institutional strategy could be echoing a wider shift in the 
structure of the field of international justice. Indeed, the strategy of the PCA can also be 
correlated to transformations in the wider markets of users of international justice.  In particular, 
the success of the PCA seems to have also hinged on its capacity to respond to changing state 
and corporate interests, in the face of growing criticisms against investment arbitration. From the 
early 2000s, the threat of challenges by corporations against governmental policies to regulate 
and steer their economy89 or core public policies in the health or environment sector90 have led to 
policy shifts within treaty investments themselves aimed also at avoiding the potential backfires 
against corporations from the North spurred by bi-directional investment flows.91 The diffusion 
from 2004 of a ‘U.S. BIT model’ bundling together trade and investment matters and 
incorporating mechanisms of inter-state control over investor-state arbitration has been 
correlated with a move of states from the North away from investor-state dispute settlement.92 
There have also been growing numbers of inter-state proceedings launched pursuant to bilateral 
investment treaties, including some motivated directly by parallel or prior investor-state 
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arbitrations. 93 This demand for more flexible international dispute settlement mechanisms, 
allowing for opt-in (or out) strategies for states, according to the interests at stake, is reflected in 
the institutional stance of the PCA.  Characteristically, Hugo Siblecz, the current Secretary-
General of the PCA has striven to emphasize the strategic position of his institution as both 
endowed with the symbolic authority of the public side of international justice, and adapted to 
the flexibility required by these changing interests. He thus underscored that ‘the UNICTRAL 
Rules, developed with a commercial context in mind, have had a great impact on inter-state 
arbitrations at the PCA and on the evolution of the PCA’s own rules.’ But he also recalled the 
role played by the PCA as a bank of symbolic capital at the turn of the twentieth century for the 
creation and success of international commercial arbitration institutions: ‘the practices and 
principles developed in the Hague Conventions proved directly relevant to the evolution of 
international commercial arbitration.’94  
This strategic positioning has been correlated with the adoption of new rules in the 2000s. 
The latter have aimed specifically at heralding the institution as a potential forum for disputes 
‘with any combination of parties (…) involving at least a State, State controlled entity, or 
international organization,’ notably through the adoption of the 2001 ‘Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment.’ This positions 
the PCA precisely as a potential forum for the settlement of the types of disputes that have 
garnered mounting criticism against the ICSID and investment arbitration. In this, the PCA 
competes not only with the ICSID and other investment arbitration forums, but also with the ICJ, 
for more classic inter-state disputes over internal conflicts and frontier delimitation contests.95 
Sheer volumes indicate the success of this strategy. In 2014, the PCA administered 128 cases (39 
of which were initiated that year), that is, nearly four times as many as the total number of cases 
submitted to it in the first century of its existence. 69 of these cases related to investor-state 
disputes arising under bilateral/multilateral investment treaties and national investment laws.96  
This institutional story could thus be refracting an ongoing transformation within the 
wider markets of users of international justice. This seems to be confirmed by the radical shift in 
the profiles of arbitrators selected by states within their national groups to the PCA between 
1999 and 2013. Among the latter, the now substantial number of arbitrators with a corporate 
legal background could be indicating the growing prominence of multinational corporate law 
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firms within the marketplaces for international justice: not only as the best positioned to offer 
flexible, multiple, legal services – be it commercial arbitration or inter-state adjudication – but 
also as driving engines of co-optation of national legal elites.  
Thus, the list of 1999 still reflects a universe of national elites of international law very 
similar to the profiles of the lawyers involved in international justice institutions at the moment 
of the genesis – and the complementary characteristics of the judges of the ICJ. They typically 
have a background as law professors, jurisconsultes and/or high judges. Among the 58 members 
from European and North-American countries, the largely dominant profile remains that of the 
law professor-jurisconsulte. Very few have occupied high governmental or judicial positions. By 
contrast, the other 213 members from outside Europe/the US display a multi-positioned 
combination of strong national resources:  beyond academic credentials at the national and 
international levels, about a quarter have been appointed to high governmental positions, most 
often as Foreign affairs ministers, but also prime ministers, presidents of the Parliament, 
sometimes even Heads of state. An important proportion has also been appointed to the highest 
judicial national positions (as Chief justice or Solicitor general) along appointments to high 
international jurisdictions. With few exceptions, access to international jurisdictions stems out of 
this strong cumulated capital of symbolic authority from national governmental and judicial 
platforms. The acquisition of a capital of international relations is also often built out of key 
diplomatic positions, as Ambassador in key postings (New York, Geneva or the Hague). 
Significantly, among the 1999 cohort of notables of international law, very few mention an 
experience in arbitration or any proximity with corporate legal practice.  
By contrast, the 2013 list of arbitrators suggests a diversification towards profiles much 
closer to international commercial arbitration and, more generally corporate legal practice. 
Compared to the 1999 list, among the 262 arbitrators, the mention of private arbitration skills is 
increased from 3 percent to 22 percent. Conversely, less than one third are now identified as law 
professors-jurisconsultes. These shifts are more evident for states that could be qualified as the 
periphery or new entrants within the international markets for international justice, particularly 
new or more recent member-states to the PCA, typically from the former USSR block and Asia. 
For those, there is an extremely large proportion of arbitrators mentioning skills in commercial 
arbitration or corporate legal practice, for example: Serbia (3/4), Estonia (2/4), Lithuania (2/4), 
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Philippines (3/3), Singapore (3/4), Malaysia (1/2).97  By contrast, arbitrators from European and 
North-American countries still display the more traditional profile of the scholar-jurisconsulte: 
for example, Germany (4/4), UK (4/4), Spain (4/4), Portugal (3/4), Austria (2/3), Denmark  (2/3), 
France (2/4).  
This shift is to some extent necessarily biased by the multi-positioning that still 
characterizes international lawyers from the Global South at the national and international levels, 
in that practice within a corporate law firm can often be combined with a multiplicity of other 
positions and resources. This could however also be indicating a wider, structural, shift in these 
markets of potential users of international justice. The radical transformation of the profiles of 
the Singapore group between 1999 and 2013 is remarkable in this regard. The 1999 group 
included one professor-jurisconsulte and two solicitors. By contrast, all four arbitrators 
appointed in 2013 have an expertise and a professional trajectory connected to corporate law. 
The biographical entry of one of them is a case in point. Now the managing partner of a major 
corporate law firm after serving as Attorney General and Chief Justice, his biographical entry 
also underscores that he is the best Asian specialist of international commercial arbitration. 
These patterns could be an indicator of strategies of repositioning that are at once political and 
professional. This is particularly well illustrated in the case of Singapore, as the profiles of its 
arbitrators could reflect this state’s strategic positioning as a new hub for commercial arbitration 
in Asia. More generally, however, the profiles of the arbitrators of new state entrants to the PCA 
and beyond, of new arbitrators selected in 2013 from the Global South, all underscore some level 
of skills and positions in corporate legal practice. With a tendency to be less multi-positioned, 
they thus more often come from legal practice rather than academia, and fewer have held high 
judicial or governmental functions at the domestic level. Rather, they tend to mention their 
arbitration experience at the national level, notably within Chambers of commerce, and 
especially at the international level within diverse arbitration forums: the ICC in Paris for a third 
of them, and for another third the ICSID, MERCOSUR and WTO panels. One could surmise 
from these profiles that these newcomers vie to enter the marketplaces for international justice 
more from a professional platform in international (corporate) law than as gentlemen politicians 
of law. This seems to be corroborated by their academic credentials, with an important 
proportion holding an LLM in corporate law from North-American law schools.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Where does international justice draw its authority in an international scene largely 
driven by self-regulated professional markets for the settlement of transnational disputes? To 
revisit this classical and ever more urgent debate, this article has underscored the characteristic 
of international justice as a market for symbolic goods in which there is a dynamic relation 
between the producers of international law - that is, professionals of international justice - and 
the users of international dispute settlement mechanisms. More than anecdotal, indeed, the social 
and professional characteristics of the professionals involved in these mechanisms could help 
account for the professional drivers - rules of the game and competition - that define the 
marketplaces for international justice. Beyond, the resources valued for access and status within 
these marketplaces - technical, scholarly, but also social, political or economic - could be an 
indicator of the interests, and with them, the credibility of international justice institutions among 
constituencies of users: not only states and corporations, but also professionals vying to enter 
these marketplaces. In doing so, this article has suggested a departure from existing accounts. 
Considering international justice as a field emphasized how the institutional and professional 
segmentation of international justice between a public and a private side, and their growing 
convergence, can be related at once to professional competition and to wider structural changes 
on the diplomatic scene and the global economy.  
In this social and professional history of international justice, the most striking shift is 
arguably the relative devaluation of scholarly capital and the prominence taken by corporate 
legal practice, and with it multinational corporate law firms, for access and status within the 
marketplaces of international justice. This growing prominence could be related to the contrasted 
relational dynamic of the marketplace for inter-state adjudication on the one hand, and that of 
commercial arbitration on the other, with their wider constituencies of (potential) users. The 
international bar of the ICJ developed into a restricted scholarly professional marketplace, built 
on mentor-pupil relations, a characteristic that was a crucial driver to foster the symbolic 
authority of the ICJ as the world court, but that rendered also this small market more vulnerable 
to external shocks, notably the competition of multinational corporate law firms.  By contrast, 
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the dynamic of the market for commercial arbitration builds on a very different engine of 
production and reproduction of the law: that of the Wall Street law firm, structured precisely to 
facilitate the circulation and accumulation of different forms of legal capital between scholarly 
knowledge, businesses and state power. This institutional structure seems all the better 
positioned, meanwhile, to adapt to the changing interests of states and corporations in the face of 
growing contests between corporations and states over core sovereign issues. Though 
symbolical, the transformation observed in the profiles of the national groups of arbitrators to the 
PCA seems to corroborate this shift, with national legal elites vying to enter the marketplaces for 
international justice more and more from corporate legal practice. Meanwhile, rather than a 
harmonization between rules and institutions of international justice, this growing prominence of 
multinational corporate law firms could be fostering the wider fragmentation of international 
law, by allowing for flexible, à la carte, and continuously adapting strategies of litigation.  	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